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Abstract. We incorporate normative motivations into the unilateral pre-
caution model of tort. Individuals have moral concerns about causing harm
and would like others to believe that they do. In the absence of legal liability,
causing harm suggests low concerns and is therefore damaging to ones social
image, which feeds back into incentives to take precautions. These never-
theless remain suboptimal when informal motivations are not strong enough
for injurers to willingly compensate victims ex post. By contrast, perfectly
enforced legal liability crowds out informal motivations completely (e.g., tort-
feasors su¤er no disesteem) but precautions are then e¢ cient. Under imper-
fect enforcement, informal motivations and legal sanctions complement one
another. With strict liability, individuals held liable su¤er disesteem, there
is some motivational crowding-out but no net crowding-out with respect to
overall incentives. Under the negligence rule, there is motivational crowding-
in when image concerns induce bunching on the legal due care standard.
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1 Introduction
The risk of lawsuits induces precautions to prevent accidental harm to third
parties. In the economic model of legal liability, the incentives to exercise care
are the monetary penalties set by tort rules.1 Casual observation suggests
that other motivations are often also at work. Most people exercise some
care out of intrinsic concerns about hurting others or because they fear social
disapproval if they are thought not to mind. In this paper, we augment the
standard, unilateral model of tort to include such concerns.
We consider the role of a moral prescription that seems particularly rel-
evant in a tort context. Kaplow and Shavell (2002) remark that there is a
strong norm to avoid harming others and to compensate for the harm that
one does cause. The prescription is a variant of the so-called golden rule,
i.e., do unto others as you would have them do unto you. We take this
prescription as given. Individuals are assumed to feel guilt or bad conscience
when they do not abide by it. This provides an internalized motivation to
prevent damaging events. However, individuals are assumed to be heteroge-
nous in this respect, i.e., some are intrinsically more motivated than others.
Individuals also have a preference for social approval. They care about
the esteem earned if they are believed to have good predispositions and the
disesteem or shame if not. Intrinsic predispositions are unobservable but
ones actions may provide some information. In addition to intrinsic moti-
vation, compliance with the prescription not to cause harm may therefore to
some extent also be enforced by approval or reproach from others.2
The issue is how such normative motivationsinteract with formal legal
sanctions to inuence behavior. It is often formulated in terms of whether
law and informal incentives are substitutes or complements.3 The behavioral
economics literature has much emphasized the possibility that pecuniary in-
centives may undermine informal motivations; e.g., the much quoted study by
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Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) on the crowding-out e¤ect of nes and the sur-
vey by Frey and Jegen (2001). If crowding-out e¤ects are su¢ ciently strong,
legal liability in the tort context could well be counterproductive and reduce
precautions to prevent accidental harm. On the other hand, it could be that
informal motivations and legal sanctions combine to generate too much in-
centives. For instance, Cooter and Porat (2001) ask whether courts should
deduct nonlegal sanctionsfrom legal damages to avoid overdeterrence.
We rst consider two benchmarks: no liability versus perfectly enforced
legal liability (both strict liability and the negligence rule). In the absence of
legal liability, injurers take precautions, if at all, solely out of moral or image
concerns. In fact, when such concerns are su¢ ciently strong, injurers could
go so far as to willingly compensate their victims ex post, thereby imposing
upon themselves the same penalties as under a strict liability legal regime.
Anticipating this, they would therefore choose ex ante to exert e¢ cient care.
To allow a role for legal liability, we introduce an upper bound on the extent
to which preferences di¤er from the standard model. The upper bound rules
out spontaneous compensation at equilibrium. Under no liability, individ-
uals then take suboptimal precautions but nevertheless exert some care to
avoid causing harm. By contrast, perfectly enforced legal liability crowds out
informal incentives completely, e.g., tortfeasors incur no social disapproval.
However, precautions are then socially e¢ cient, as in the standard model.
There is no overdeterrence: when legal liability is introduced, informal in-
centives either disappear or lose their bite.
Next we examine imperfectly enforced legal liability, e.g., victims do not
always bring suit because they have insu¢ cient evidence to prevail in court.
We show that normative motivations and formal legal sanctions then com-
plement one another, e.g., an individual held liable faces both legal damages
and disesteem. Thus, informal and formal incentives interact to induce more
precautions than under no liability. Under the strict liability regime, there
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is some crowding-out of informal incentives but no net crowding-out with
respect to overall incentives. Under the negligence rule, there may be moti-
vational crowding-in. Because of the signal sent by a negligence ruling, image
concerns tend to induce bunching on the legal due care standard. Thus, when
enforcement is imperfect, the negligence rule may do much better than strict
liability because of the individualsconcern for social approval. We complete
the analysis with a welfare comparison of the di¤erent legal regimes  no
liability, strict liability, and the negligence rule. In particular, we discuss
the extent to which the legal rules are consistent with the underlying moral
norm. We also discuss causation requirements under the negligence rule and
how the analysis can be extended to the bilateral precaution framework.
We share with a strand of literature the idea that an individuals actions
may signal something about his unobservable predispositions and that some
predispositions are more socially esteemed than others. In Bernheim (1994),
individuals seek to signal that they do not have extreme predispositions,
hence the possibility of an endogenous conformity norm. In Bénabou and
Tirole (2006) and Daughety and Reinganum (2010), they seek to signal that
they have good pro-social characteristics by contributing to a public good.
This leads them to contribute more than if their actions were unobservable.
In our analysis, predispositions refer to ones moral type, by which we mean
an individuals sensitivity to the prescription not to cause uncompensated
harm. By contrast with the above literature, however, an individuals actions
(i.e., precautions to avoid accidental harm) are not directly observable by the
public at large. They a¤ect public perception about ones predispositions
only through what can be inferred from the occurrence of damaging events
or from court rulings (e.g., liable for damages versus not liable).
Section 2 presents the basic setup. In section 3, we analyze no liability
and perfectly enforced liability; in section 4, imperfectly enforced liability.
Section 5 discusses the results from a utilitarian point of view. Section 6
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concludes.
2 The model
Our starting point is the unilateral accident framework of the law and eco-
nomics literature. Some individuals, hereafter injurers, engage in an activity
that may harm third parties. In the standard model, injurers care only
about their private costs and benets as conventionally dened. We briey
review the role of tort rules in this context.4 Next we introduce normative
motivations.
The standard model. The risk generating activity provides the private
benet b; with probability p it imposes on others the loss L. Both b and L
are pecuniary or are monetary equivalents; agents are risk neutral. The
probability of accident depends on the injurers precautions. A smaller p
means more precautions; the cost is c(p) with c0 < 0 and c00 > 0. At the
boundaries, c(1) = c0(1) = 0 and c0(0) =  1. Totally eliminating the risk
of harm is prohibitively costly but the marginal precaution cost is nil at the
no-precaution level.
Absent legal liability, the payo¤ from the activity is y = b   c(p); not
engaging in the activity yields a payo¤ normalized to zero. All potential
injurers therefore engage and exert no care to avoid harm. Given the loss
su¤ered by victims, social welfare isW  b  c(p) pL. The socially e¢ cient
precaution level p minimizes c(p)+ pL, the sum of precaution and expected
accident costs. Engaging in the risk generating activity is socially e¢ cient if
b  c(p)  pL > 0.
For future use, let P (t) be the level of care minimizing c(p) + tp; where
t  0 is some given parameter. The function P (t) is strictly decreasing, with
P (0) = 1. The socially e¢ cient precaution level is p = P (L).
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The tort rules that we will consider are strict liability and negligence.
Under strict liability, injurers are liable for full compensatory damages irre-
spective of the precautions they have taken. The victim then only needs to
prove causation. Litigation costs are assumed to be negligible. An injurers
expected payo¤ is therefore y  b   c(p)   pL, which induces e¢ cient pre-
cautions. Under the negligence regime, victims need to prove the injurers
carelessness, i.e., that precautions did not meet the legal due care standard.
Due care is assumed to be set at the socially e¢ cient level, meaning that neg-
ligence is found when the injurers precautionary behavior entailed p > p.
The expected payo¤ from the activity is then
y =
(
b  c(p) if p  p;
b  c(p)  pL if p > p: (1)
This is maximized by complying with due care.
Under either liability rule, potential injurers exert the rst-best level of
care. As is well known, however, the negligence rule is decient in controlling
activity levels, by contrast with strict liability (see, e.g., Shavell 1987). Under
the latter, injurers engage in the risk generating activity only if the gross
private benet is larger than the full social cost c(p) + pL. Under the
negligence rule, injurers incur only the cost of care and therefore ine¢ ciently
engage in the activity when c(p) < b < c(p)+pL. For simplicity, we assume
that the negligence rule is appropriate for the activity under consideration,
i.e., b is large and the issue is whether the activity is exercised with su¢ cient
care.5
We also need to consider situations where legal liability is only imperfectly
enforced. Victims sometimes do not le suit because they cannot prove
causation or negligence. Let q denote the probability that a victim has access
to su¢ cient evidence. Under strict liability an injurers expected payo¤ is
now y  b   c(p)   pqL. The induced care level is then p = P (qL) and is
6
suboptimal when q < 1. Under the negligence rule, the expected payo¤ is
y =
(
b  c(p) if p  p;
b  c(p)  pqL if p > p: (2)
Because of the discontinuity in the payo¤ function, e¢ cient precautions may
be induced provided the probability of enforcement is su¢ ciently large. Let
qN be the solution to
b  c(p) = max
p
b  c(p)  qNpL: (3)
When the probability of enforcement is qN , the injurer is just indi¤erent
between complying and not complying with due care. Clearly, qN < 1 and
injurers prefer complying whenever q > qN . When q < qN , they do not
comply and behave as under strict liability, i.e., p = P (qL).
Moral and image concerns. We now depart from the standard model
by introducing normative motivations. The moral prescription is that harm-
ing others should be avoided; if one nevertheless causes harm, one should
compensate the victim. To some extent, this prescription is internalized
through intrinsic moral concerns. Individuals su¤er disutility (e.g., guilt
or bad conscience) when they do not conform. Individuals also care about
social esteem and would like others to believe that they have high moral
concerns. Both moral and esteem concerns constitute normative motivations
in the sense that they derive from ones allegiance to the moral prescription
or ones attempt to signal allegiance.
The utility function is now
U(y; x; e) = y   x+ e; (4)
where y is net material payo¤, x is the harm that one causes, and e is social
esteem;  and  are positive parameters. All injurers are assumed to care
equally about social esteem, i.e., they have the same parameter . However,
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they di¤er in the extent of their moral concerns. An individuals  is private
information and denotes his moral type, by which we mean his sensitivity
to the moral prescription. The distribution of types is common knowledge
and is described by the density f() with support [l; h] and average value
. Social esteem depends on societys perception of ones moral type, i.e.,
e = I  E ( j I) where I denotes the information publicly available about
the individual; the conditional expectationE ( j I) is societys updated belief
about the individuals type. An individual will be said to earn esteem (su¤er
disesteem) when his perceived type is above (below) the population average.6
No spontaneous compensation. In the standard model,  and 
are both zero and utility reduces to the net material payo¤ y. When the
parameters are positive, however, there will be situations where all injurers
exert e¢ cient care even without legal liability. This occurs when those who
cause harm willingly compensate their victim. In the standard model there is
nothing to prevent injurers from doing so, but the issue is not raised because
injurers would never willingly compensate. We will introduce parameter
restrictions ruling out this type of behavior in the present set-up as well.
For instance, suppose that information about individuals is limited to
their involvement (or non involvement) in causing harm of amount L and
to whether compensation has been paid. Ex post, if a type- injurer does
not compensate (action 0), his utility is U0 = b   c(p)   L + 0 where
0 is the perceived moral type of injurers who do not compensate. If the
injurer compensates (action 1), he eliminates the bad feelings from not
complying with the moral prescription because in the end no harm will have
been inicted, i.e., x = 0 in the notation of equation (4). Because the
injurer thereby also transfers the victims loss to himself, his utility is U1 =
b  c(p) L+1 where 1 is the perceived type of injurers who compensate.
When the lower bound of moral types satises l  1, there is an essentially
unique equilibrium in which all injurers voluntarily compensate their victims.
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As a result, the action of compensating reveals nothing about ones moral
type; hence, at equilibrium 1 =  where  is the prior mean.7 Ex ante,
injurers anticipate that they will compensate. Therefore they choose the
precaution level that maximizes b  c(p)  pL+ , yielding the e¢ cient p.
The same outcome arises even if the upper bound of moral types satises
h < 1 provided the esteem concern parameter  is su¢ ciently large. Now
injurers will not compensate on purely moral grounds because the bad feel-
ingsfrom not complying with the moral prescription is less painful to them
than the money cost of compensating. However, injurers care a lot about the
disesteem they would su¤er by signalling their disregard for the prescriptive
rule.8 Again, the action of compensating will be anticipated ex ante so that
all injurers will exert the e¢ cient precaution level. As in the previous exam-
ple, formal legal liability would serve no purpose. The following parameter
restriction rules out spontaneous compensation.
Assumption 1: l = 0, h < L=( + L):
The condition denes an upper bound on the extent to which preferences
depart from the standard model. Injurers put some weight on complying
with the moral prescription (some put zero or negligible weight), but they
all put greater weight on their own material payo¤, i.e.,  < 1 for all types.
Moreover, their moral concerns and their desire for social esteem cannot
simultaneously be too large.
Let U0 and U1 be dened as above. A type- injurer chooses not to
compensate his victim if U1 < U0, that is if

 
1   0

< (1  )L: (5)
Beliefs about ones type belong to the interval [0; h], so that 1   0  h.
Assumption 1 can be rewritten as h < (1  h)L, implying that (5) always
holds. Thus, we have:
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Lemma 1 At equilibrium, injurers do not voluntarily compensate their vic-
tims.
When the support of types is an interval of the form [0; h], assumption
1 is necessary to rule out voluntary compensation in the absence of further
restrictions on the probability distribution of types. Although our injurers
di¤er from standard homo economicus, they therefore behave the same way
following the occurrence of harm. By contrast, if they were to voluntar-
ily compensate their victims, they would impose upon themselves the same
penalties as under the strict liability legal regime.9
Posterior information. Throughout the paper, with a qualication in
the case of negligence based liability, an injurers precautions are assumed to
be private information. Precautions can a¤ect esteem only indirectly through
the occurrence or non occurrence of harm. This is in line with the view that
tort law is an ex post harm-based mechanism for deterring undesirable be-
havior, by contrast with an ex ante act-based approach as with safety reg-
ulations.10 When the tort regime is negligence, we will suppose that some
evidence about the injurers precautions becomes available to the court and
that the evidence is su¢ ciently informative to assess whether the injurer
complied with due care. However, the general public is assumed to be in-
formed only of the courts ruling, not of the detailed evidence disclosed at
trial. Social esteem depends on information available at large in the general
public.
In our basic scenario, ex post public information about an injurer will
take the form of a binary signal with the random outcome B or G. The
notation is B for bad newsand G for good news. The interpretation of
these events depends on the context. For instance, B may be injurer caused
harmor injurer caused harm and was found negligent (hence is liable for
damages under a negligence rule). Observe that the ex post information
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about an injurers predisposition would not reduce to events such as B or G
if, at equilibrium, injurers attempted to signal their type by voluntarily com-
pensating victims. From lemma 1, because no one compensates, nothing can
be inferred from the fact that a particular injurer did not o¤er compensation.
The probability of the random events depends on the injurers precau-
tions; we denote with '(p) the probability of B. Inferences about an injurers
predisposition depend on whether B or G occurred. A general formulation
for the expected utility of a type- injurer is then
U = y(p)  x(p) +  '(p)B + (1  '(p))G ; (6)
where y(p) is the injurers expected material payo¤, x(p) is the expected
uncompensated harm for which he will feel morally responsible, and B
and G are societys posterior beliefs about ones type. The expected values
y(p) and x(p) depend on the legal regime because it determines whether the
victim or the injurer ultimately bears the accidental loss. Societys posterior
beliefs are part of an equilibrium.
Definition 1: A perfect Bayesian equilibrium consists of strategies bp()
and of beliefs B and G such that
(i) bp() solves maxp y(p)  x(p) + ['(p)B + (1  '(p))G],  2 [0; h];
(ii) if 'B 
R h
0
'(bp())f() d > 0,
B =
R h
0
'(bp())f() d
'B
: (7)
(iii) if 1  'B > 0,
G =
R h
0
[1  '(bp())]f() d
1  'B
; (8)
Beliefs satisfy Bayesian up-dating when the conditioning events have pos-
itive probability over the population of injurers. When a conditioning event
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has zero probability, the posterior belief is to some extent arbitrary. In some
settings, bad news will never occur at equilibrium. This arises when all
injurers conform to a standard of behavior precluding bad news. In that
case, G =  and the equilibrium will be supportedby a range of out-of-
equilibrium beliefs B. It will often be convenient to think of these beliefs
as B = 0. The reason is that the worst moral type will then be the one
who would lose the least from a deviation to an action generating a positive
probability of bad news.11
Of particular interest is   G   B, the gap in social esteem between
good and bad news, which we will refer to as the reputational penalty. When
both B and G have positive probability, (7) and (8) can be combined to yield
 =  
R h
0
['(bp())  'B]f() d
'B(1  'B)
: (9)
The integral in the numerator is the covariance between  and '(bp()), a
negative quantity when '(bp()) is decreasing in . Esteem concerns provide
incentives through the reputational penalty attached to bad news.
3 No Liability vs Perfectly Enforced Liability
While injurers are not willing to compensate their victims ex post, they will
want to take some precautions to prevent the occurrence of harm. We con-
sider two benchmarks. The rst is the case where harm is not subject to legal
liability. Incentives to take precautions then rely solely on moral and esteem
concerns. In particular, individuals will take some precautions because the
marginal precaution cost is nil at the zero precaution level and they antici-
pate the guilt of causing uncompensated harm (given that they will not want
to compensate ex post). Next, we introduce perfectly enforced legal liability
and examine how this combines with normative motivations.
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No liability. Causing harm often does not trigger legal liability. It may
be that the harm is not subject to judicial sanction because it is trivial or
considered part of the usual risks of life. Even when legal liability applies in
principle, victims often do not le suit because judicial procedures are too
expensive compared to the stakes.
Let k denote the probability that the injurers involvement in causing
harm becomes publicly known. Consider rst the no-publicity case where
an individual causing harm is never detected (e.g., damages to ones car in a
parking lot). A type  injurer then chooses his precaution level p to maximize
U = b  c(p)  pL+ :
Because no information about the injurer is made public, his perceived type
is the prior mean. Using the function dened in the previous section, the
type- injurer chooses p = P (L). Given Assumption 1, this is greater than
the e¢ cient p but less than unity, i.e., some precautions are taken out of
moral concerns. More morally concerned individuals exert greater care.
Suppose now that k is positive. Denote by B the event an occurrence of
harm is ascribed to the injurer. In other words, an accident has occurred
and the injurers involvement is common knowledge. In terms of the notation
of the previous section, event B has probability '(p) = pk. The event G is
no occurrence of harm is ascribed to the injurer, meaning that there is no
information concerning the injurers involvement in an accident. This event
has probability
1  p+ p(1  k) = 1  pk:
Either harm has not occurred or it has occurred but has not been observed
by society at large or has been observed but not causally related to the
particular injurer (i.e., the injurer is not detected).
The expected utility of a type- injurer is now
U = b  c(p)  pL+ [pkB + (1  pk)G]: (10)
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This can be rewritten as
U = b+ G   c(p)  p(L+ k); where   G   B: (11)
In equilibrium, societys beliefs will satisfy B <  < G; that is, event B
inicts disesteem while event G provides esteem. Given the reputational
penalty, the best-response function of a type- individual is then
p0(;) = P (L+ k); (12)
where the subscript stands for zero liability. Compared to no publicity,
esteem concerns now provide incentives.
The equilibrium reputational penalty is obtained by substituting the in-
jurersbest response functions (12) for bp() in the right-hand side of (9) and
solving the resulting equation for . The solution satises 0 <  < h.12
Less morally concerned individuals exert less care and therefore are more
often involved in causing accidents; hence, a below average moral type is in-
ferred from the occurrence of harm. One can show that injurers exert greater
care the greater the publicity about involvement in causing harm. Neverthe-
less, moral and esteem concerns are never strong enough to induce e¢ cient
care, even when causing harm is always detected.13
Perfectly enforced legal rules. Perfect enforcement corresponds to
the elementary version of the economic model of torts. Suppose that, follow-
ing the occurrence of harm, victims always have access to perfect evidence
and can therefore always prove causation. This su¢ ces under strict liabil-
ity. Under the negligence rule, victims receive evidence showing whether the
defendant was negligent or not. A lawsuit imposes a small cost on plain-
ti¤s, so that they sue only if they have a valid claim, but litigation costs are
otherwise negligible. Suppose also that out-of-court settlements are infeasi-
ble, hence all suits go to trial. Finally, suppose that trial outcomes are the
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only information that becomes available to the general public. We derive the
implications of these assumptions and then show that some can be relaxed.
Under strict liability, victims always sue. Injurers therefore know that,
should they cause harm, they will have to pay compensatory damages and
that their involvement in causing harm will be public information. The
bad news event B is injurer was found liable. This has probability p.
The complementary event G is injurer was not sued, hence did not cause
harm. Injurers are forced to compensate their victim. Albeit unwillingly,
they therefore comply with the underlying moral prescription. As a result,
they su¤er no moral disutility but bear the victims losses. The expected
utility of a type- injurer is then
U = b  c(p)  pL+ [pB + (1  p)G]:
Expected utility does not depend on the injurerstype and best responses
are therefore type independent. It follows that the events G and B provide
no information about type, i.e., at equilibrium B = G = . All injurers
choose the e¢ cient precaution level p and there is no reputational penalty
from causing harm.
Under the negligence rule, injurers who comply with due care are never
sued. Those who do not comply and cause harm are found negligent and
this becomes public information. Thus, the bad news event B is injurer was
found negligent. Event G is the complementary event injurer has not been
sued, which means that either the injurer was not involved in causing harm
or that he caused harm but complied with due care, hence was not sued. A
type- injurer now has the expected utility
U =
(
b  c(p)  pL+ G if p  p;
b  c(p)  pL+ [pB + (1  p)G] if p > p:
(13)
The upper branch is the expected utility when the precaution level satises
due care. With probability one, the injurers perceived type will then be G.
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With probability p, the injurer will nevertheless cause uncompensated harm,
which yields moral disutility. The lower branch is for an injurer who does
not comply with due care. With probability 1  p, harm will not occur and
the belief will again be G. With probability p, the injurer will be sued and
will pay damages. He then su¤ers no moral disutility from having caused
harm but his perceived type is B.
Consider rst the injurers best precaution level consistent with meeting
the due care standard. Because c(p)+ pL is strictly convex and is minimized
at p,
dU
dp
=   c0(p)  L >   c0(p)  L  0, for all p  p.
Thus, precautions will never exceed due care. For precaution levels that do
not satisfy due care, and supposing that B  G,
dU
dp
=   c0(p)  L  (G   B) < 0, for all p > p.
Combining both results (and noting that complying with due care does
strictly better than barely not complying), the utility maximizing precau-
tion level is p. Because all injurers exercise due care, G =  and B is an
out-of-equilibrium belief. From the above argument, any B   supports
the equilibrium. Figure 1 illustrates the discontinuity in the expected utility
of a type- individual.
<<COMP: Place Fig. 1 about here>>
Our assumptions about the litigation subgame can be modied in many
respects without a¤ecting the outcome. For instance, it would not matter
if out-of-court settlements were allowed and their content remained secret.
Victims would obtain the same damages as they would at trial, which is all
that matters. The outcome would also remain the same if involvement in
causing harm is assumed to be publicly observable independently of court
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rulings or lawsuits. Under strict liability, causing harm and being held liable
are the same events. Under the negligence rule, individuals causing harm are
never found negligent.
The following proposition summarizes our results for both no liability and
perfectly enforced liability.
Proposition 1 Under no liability, individuals known to have caused harm
su¤er disesteem; moral and image concerns mitigate carelessness but injurers
exert sub-optimal care. Under perfectly enforced liability rules, individuals
known to have caused harm su¤er no diseesteem; injurers exert e¢ cient care
and normative motivations play no role in providing incentives.
When formal legal sanctions are introduced and enforcement is perfect,
moral concerns either disappear (under strict liability) or are superuous for
the provision of incentives (under the negligence rule). Under strict liability,
esteem concerns have no bite because an adverse court ruling inicts no
disesteem. Under the negligence rule, a ruling of negligence would inict
disesteem (given, say, B = 0), but the threat of disesteem is superuous
in inducing e¢ cient care. Legal liability causes motivational crowding-out
in the sense that formal incentives are not simply added to informal ones.
However, there is no net crowding out e¤ect because all injurers exert greater
care than in the absence of formal sanctions.
4 Imperfectly Enforced Legal Rules
We now assume that victims have access to perfect evidence only with prob-
ability q. Specically, a victim knows for sure whether he has su¢ cient evi-
dence to succeed in court or whether he does not; this is common knowledge
between the parties. Given a small cost of ling suit, worthy victims there-
fore litigate only with probability q. By contrast with perfect enforcement,
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esteem concerns will now be shown to matter. What information becomes
public therefore also matters. For instance, even though litigation costs are
negligible, injurers would favor condential settlements  possibly allowing
victims to extract hush money if disesteem can thereby be avoided.14 For
simplicity, we consider a litigation subgame where ex post public information
e¤ectively reduces to a binary outcome, as in the previous section. First, the
ling of a lawsuit is public information and of course so would be the outcome
at trial. Secondly, secret settlements are not feasible: if payment has been
extracted from an injurer, information is always leaked and it becomes pub-
licly known that an agreement was reached. Finally, an injurers involvement
in causing harm is not publicly observable independently of lawsuits.
In this simple framework, victims with a non viable case do nothing. Vic-
tims with a viable case le suit and pursue the case up to trial; equivalently,
they settle for the amount of damages they would have obtained in court.
In either case, the reputational e¤ect on the injurer is the same. An out-of-
court settlement imposes the same reputational penalty because settlements
are public information and the injurer would not have o¤ered payment if
the victim had no evidence; since the reputational penalty is the same, the
injurer will not want to settle for more than the damages he would have paid
if the case had gone to trial (and the victim would not accept less). On the
other hand, if the victim does not have a viable case, ling suit is not worth
the small ling cost.
Strict liability. Because victims le suit only with probability q, the
probability of legal damages (and the probability of bad news) is 'S(p) = pq,
where the subscript stands for strict liability. The event G is injurer was not
sued, hence did not cause harm or caused harm but there was no evidence
to prove it. The expected utility of a type- injurer is
U = b  c(p)  pqL  p(1  q)L+ [pqB + (1  pq)G];
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When he is not sued, the injurer su¤ers moral disutility from causing uncom-
pensated harm. The best response function is
pS(;) = P [(q + (1  q))L+ q]; (14)
An injurers precautions depend on his type whenever the probability of
enforcement is less than unity. The analysis is similar to that of no-liability.
Being sued (and settling or being held liable if the case goes to trial) now
imposes a reputational penalty. The equilibrium penalty solves equation (9)
with pS(;) substituted for bp() in the right-hand side.
In the preceding section no liability was compared with perfectly enforced
strict liability, a rule known to induce e¢ cient care when informal motivations
are non-existent. Does the introduction of imperfectly enforced strict liability
also increase incentives to exert care? A natural comparison is with no
liability for the same probability of publicity about involvement in causing
harm. From (12), a type- injurers incentives to exert care under no liability
are given by L + k0, where 0 is the equilibrium reputational penalty
under no liability. From (14), the injurers incentives under strict liability
are (q+(1 q))L+qS, where S is the equilibrium reputational penalty
under strict liability. When k = q, moral incentives are lower under strict
liability because injurers will sometimes be forced to pay damages, but the
lower moral incentives are more than compensated by the greater expected
legal damages. However, reputational incentives are likely to be weaker, i.e.,
S < 0. The intuition is that the introduction of legal liability has a
relatively greater e¤ect on the incentives of injurers with low moral concerns.
When precautions become more alike between types, the bad news-good news
signal will be less informative about moral type; hence esteem concerns will
have less bite because the reputational penalty will be smaller.15
Proposition 2 When strict liability is imperfectly enforced, injurers known
to have caused harm su¤er disesteem, both moral and esteem concerns miti-
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gate carelessness, and greater care is exerted than under no liability with the
same (or a smaller) probability of observing involvement in causing harm.
The proposition is a no net crowding-out result: even when they are
imperfectly enforced, formal sanctions increase incentives to exert care com-
pared to no liability, although there is some crowding-out of informal moti-
vations. Note that in practice a move from no liability to a strict liability
regime with negligible litigation costs may well increase publicity, i.e., q > k,
because victims now have monetary incentives to reveal the occurrence of
harm by ling suit.
Negligence rule. The probability of being sued and found negligent is
'N(p) = 0 if p  p and 'N(p) = pq otherwise, where the subscript refers
to the negligence rule. Event G is injurer did not cause harm, or caused
harm but complied with due care, or did not comply but the victim could
not prove it. The expected utility of a type- injurer is
U =
(
b  c(p)  pL+ G if p  p;
b  c(p)  p(q + (1  q))L+ [pqB + (1  pq)G] if p > p:
(15)
There will now be situations where all injurers exert e¢ cient care even
though enforcement is imperfect. This is not surprising considering that
in the standard model injurers comply with due care when the probability
of enforcement is above the critical qN dened in (3). In the present case,
however, compliance will also obtain even with enforcement below qN . The
pattern of compliance is straightforward: if some moral type complies with
due care, so will higher types (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix). Hence, either
everyone complies, no one does or high moral types do and low ones do not.
The smallest probability of enforcement consistent with a full compliance
equilibrium is now q1 solving
b  c(p) +  = max
p
b  c(p)  qpL+ (1  pq): (16)
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The right-hand side is the expected utility of the non-complying no-moral-
concern type (i.e.,  = 0) who anticipates G =  if he is not found negligent
and B = 0 if he is. Note that this yields the largest reputational penalty
consistent with a full compliance equilibrium. When the probability of en-
forcement is q1, the worst moral type is just indi¤erent between complying
and not. Obviously q1 < qN .
Proposition 3 Under the negligence rule enforced with probability q, all in-
jurers exert more care than under no liability with the same (or a smaller)
probability of publicity.
(i) When q  qN , the equilibrium is the same as under the perfectly enforced
negligence rule and normative motivations play no role.
(ii) When q1  q < qN , all injurers comply with due care. Moral concerns
play no role, but esteem concerns provide incentives to comply.
(iii) There exists q0 < q1 such that, when q0  q < q1, higher moral types com-
ply with due care, lower ones do not. Moral and esteem concerns inuence
the decision to comply and, for non compliers, they mitigate carelessness.
(iv) When q < q0, no one complies and the outcome is the same as under
strict liability with the same probability of enforcement.
The proof is in the Appendix. Figure 2 provides an illustration. The
curves pN and pS depict the average probability of harm under the negligence
and strict liability regimes as a function of the probability of enforcement.
The curve p0 is the average probability of accident under no liability as a
function of the probability of publicity.
<<COMP: Place Fig. 2 about here>>
Under the negligence rule, when enforcement is above q1, all injurers
comply with due care. Because even type  = 0 complies, moral incentives
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play no role in inducing compliance. When q  qN , esteem concerns play
no role either, as indeed in the standard model. However, when q 2 [q1; qN)
the full compliance equilibrium is supported only with beliefs satisfying B <
 = G, i.e., lower moral types conform because of the risk of looking badif
they were to be found negligent. In particular, at the threshold q1, B = 0 is
the unique out-of-equilibrium belief consistent with full compliance. Injurers
with  = 0 are then induced to comply with due care because of the threat of
being perceived as the worst moral type (which they are) if found negligent.
Thus, esteem concerns provide useful incentives when q < qN .
<<COMP: Place Fig. 3 about here>>
Figure 3 illustrates the expected utility of type  = 0 in a full compliance
equilibrium with q > q1. The utility from complying with due care is U c. The
expected utility from not complying is Unc(q); if he were not to comply, the
best this injurer could do is to choose the precaution level denoted by pnc(q).
The utility from not complying is drawn given the out-of-equilibrium belief
B = 0, so that the reputational penalty from being found negligent is  = 
(when q > q1 a smaller reputational penalty would obviously also induce
compliance). The utility di¤erence between complying and not complying is
then
U c   Unc(q) = qpnc(q)[L+ ]  [c(p)  c(pnc(q))]:
By not complying the injurer would save on precaution costs, but this is more
than compensated by the risk of legal damages and of disesteem. When q is
reduced, U c does not change but Unc(q) increases. At q = q1 both are equal.
When enforcement is smaller than q1, both moral and reputational incen-
tives play a role. When q  q0, the more morally concerned types  those
with  above a threshold that depends on q  comply with due care. Intu-
itively, it is less costlyto comply for more morally concerned individuals.
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Less morally concerned injurers do not comply, but their carelessness is mit-
igated by both moral and esteem concerns as under an imperfectly enforced
strict liability regime.
The intuition for the result is that a ruling of negligence provides sharper
information about the injurers behavior than the mere occurrence of harm.
Compared with strict liability or no liability, the negligence regime may
crowd in normative motivations through the greater role of esteem con-
cerns. When the probability of enforcement is not too low, a small departure
from due care generates the risk of a large reputational penalty. As a result,
injurers or at least some of them will choose to conform, i.e., to pool on the
due care precaution level.
The outcome would remain the same qualitatively if involvement in caus-
ing harm were public information independently of lawsuits. The event G
would then be partitioned into two events, say G1 and G2, where G1 means
did not cause harmand G2 means caused harm but was not sued. When
the tort rule is su¢ ciently well enforced for all injurers to comply, the equi-
librium beliefs are G1 = G2 = . When not all injurers comply, it is
straightforward to see that G1 > , but whether G2 would be good or bad
news depends on the probability of enforcement.
5 Discussion
The di¤erent legal regimes (no liability, strict liability and the negligence
rule) were compared in terms of how close the injurers precautions were
to the e¢ cient precaution level of the standard model. When injurers have
moral and esteem concerns, however, it is not clear that p is still the appro-
priate target. We now compare the di¤erent regimes in an explicit utilitarian
framework.
We also discuss a related but more intricate issue. In our analysis, the
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moral prescription was exogenously given. We then examined how legal
incentives interact with normative concerns to deter careless behavior. We
did not consider the degree to which the legal normwas consistent with or
di¤ered from the moral norm, nor the possibility that the legal normcould
inuence the individualsmoral preferences.
Comparison of regimes. The costs of enforcing formal sanctions would
naturally bear on the comparison of legal regimes. Nevertheless, we will
continue to abstract from such costs.
Suppose that injurers can also be victims; that is, they can themselves
su¤er harm caused by other agents. For instance, the risk generating activity
under consideration is an activity such as driving which everyone engages
in.16 Let U j() be the equilibrium expected utility of a type- injurer as
dened in the previous sections, where j denotes the legal regime. Because
individuals are now potentially both injurer and victim, the pecuniary part
of ones utility is modied to take into account the expected loss that the
individual faces due to the actions of others. Under no liability, the expected
wealth of the type- individual is then b   c(bp0())   p0L. The term p0L is
the expected loss the individual faces as potential victim, given the average
probability p0 that another individual will cause harm in the no-liability
equilibrium. Under the strict liability and negligence regimes, the expected
wealth of the type- individual is
b  c(bpj())  'j(bpj())L  Z h
0
bpj()  'j(bpj())Lf() d; j = S;N:
The last term is the expected loss as victim net of the legal damages that
may eventually be awarded.
Per-capita welfare is17
Wj =
Z h
0
U j()f() d; j = 0; S;N:
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Under no liability, this is easily seen to yield
W0 = (b  c0   p0L) 
Z h
0
bp0()Lf() d + ;
where c0 is the average precaution cost. The expression inside the rst paren-
theses is the average net wealth. The middle term is the average moral disu-
tility from causing uncompensated harm. The last term is the average utility
from social esteem; reputational benets and penalties cancel out. Similarly,
under the strict liability and negligence regimes, total welfare is
Wj = (b  cj   pjL) 
Z h
0

bpj()  'j(bpj())Lf() d + ; j = S;N:
Consider the perfectly enforced strict liability regime. All individuals then
take e¢ cient care and full compensatory damages are always paid. Hence
WS = b  pL  c(p) +   W ; (17)
Clearly, welfare cannot be greater than W : wealth is maximized and there
is no moral disutility from having caused harm. The perfectly enforced neg-
ligence rule also maximizes wealth. However, total welfare is now
WN = b  pL  c(p)  pL+  = W    pL: (18)
Under strict liability, individuals bear accidental harm as injurers but not
as victims. Under the negligence rule, it is the opposite since no one is
found negligent. Under this rule, however, individuals as injurers su¤er moral
disutility from inicting uncompensated harm.
Proposition 4 When liability rules are perfectly enforced, W0 < WN < WS.
Strict liability yields greater welfare than the negligence rule because it
forces injurers to compensate their victims, thereby eliminating the moral
disutility from causing harm. It is as if strict liability forced injurers to
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purchase a clear conscience, something they would not do spontaneously
(given Assumption 1). In turn, welfare is greater under negligence than under
no liability because average wealth is larger and because the moral cost of
imposing uncompensated harm is smaller; both results follow from the fact
that bp0() > p for all types.
When enforcement is imperfect, the welfare comparison is not as straight-
forward. For instance, it is not clear how negligence compares with strict
liability with the same probability of enforcement. Suppose q  q1 as dened
in proposition 4. Under negligence, all individuals then exercise e¢ cient care.
Wealth is therefore greater under negligence than under strict liability. On
the other hand, the average moral disutility could be smaller under strict
liability.
Legal versus moral norms. In the above analysis, legal liability re-
duced to a pure system of monetary penalties contingent on some evidence.
We now inquire about the values underlying legal liability.
The moral prescription we postulated was that harming others should
be avoided and that one should compensate for the harm that one does
cause. Compliance with the prescription would arise spontaneously if all
individuals were su¢ ciently morally concerned, say with   1. In a less
than ideal world, such individuals rarely exist. However, strict legal liability
can in principle (when enforcement is perfect) induce individuals to behave
in perfect conformity with the moral prescription. Thus, one could say that
strict liability expressesperfectly the underlying moral norm.
This is not so with the negligence rule we considered. Under this rule,
there is no legal wrongdoingwhen harm occurs and the injurers actions
complied with the legal due care standard. In our analysis, moral values
were taken to be una¤ected by the legal norm; that is, the individualscon-
ception of moral wrongdoingremained based solely on the prescription that
one should not cause uncompensated harm. As a result, morally concerned
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individuals su¤er disutility from causing harm even if they are not legally
culpable. For instance, a driver may feel bad from hitting a pedestrian even
though he is not found negligent.
It has been argued that legal rules have normative power in that they
a¤ect behavior not only by shaping the material payo¤s but also by directly
inuencing motives. If law expresses values, it could change the individuals
perception of the moral prescription.18 In the present context, one possibility
is that the legal norm of due care modies the interpretation of wrongdoing.
Individuals who comply with the legal rule of conduct experience no moral
disutility from causing harm. Because of the legal norm dened by due care,
the individuals utility in (4) is now
U = y   (p)x+ e;
where (p) = 0 if p  p and (p) = 1 otherwise. Welfare under the negligence
rule is then
WN = (b  cN   pNL) 
Z h
0
(bpN()) [bpN()  'N(bpN())]Lf() d + 
where bpN() now denotes the equilibrium strategy under the new moral pref-
erences.
Proposition 5 Suppose individuals have no moral concerns about causing
uncompensated harm when they comply with due care under the negligence
rule. If the probability of enforcement satises q  q1 as dened in Proposi-
tion 3, WN = W   WS with strict inequality when q < 1.
Everything else equal, compared to the situation where moral preferences
are una¤ected by the legal norm, complying with due care is as desirable
when  > 0 and it remains the same when  = 0. Hence, the threshold
q1 for overall compliance remains unchanged. Welfare under the negligence
rule is now greater because moral concerns are in line with the legal norm of
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conduct. Because the negligence rule has the potential to implement e¢ cient
care even when enforcement is imperfect, it now dominates strict liability.
Causation requirement under the negligence rule. Grady (1983)
remarked that the standard accident model disregards causation require-
ments for a ruling of negligence. The issue of causation yields interesting
insights in our analysis. As a matter of doctrine, in both common law and
civil law systems, injurers are liable for damages if they did not comply with
due care and if their negligence can be shown to have causedthe accident,
i.e., the accident would not have occurred had they not been negligent. To
deal with causation requirements, a more elaborate description of the sto-
chastic environment is needed.19
We consider the simple model proposed by Kahan (1989); see also Schweizer
(2009). In this model, when an accident occurs and the injurer was negligent
(i.e., p > p), the probability that negligence will be found to be the cause
of the accident is equal to (p  p)=p. Given a probability of enforcement q,
the expected pecuniary payo¤ as a function of the precaution level is then
y =
(
b  c(p) if p  p;
b  c(p)  q(p  p)L:
By contrast with the full liability formulation discussed until now, there
is no discontinuity in the expected payo¤ function at the due care level. It
follows that, in the model without normative motivations, an imperfectly
enforced negligence rule yields the same outcome as strict liability with the
same probability of enforcement.
We now introduce normative motivations into this model. Suppose the
injurer feels no guilt when he complied with due care or when he did not
comply but his negligence was not the cause of harm (i.e.,  = 0 in the
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notation of the previous section). The expected utility is then
U =
(
b  c(p) + G if p  p;
b  c(p)  (p  p)(q + (1  q))L+ [pqB + (1  pq)G] if p > p:
The di¤erence in expected utility between complying and barely not com-
plying is now equal to
pq(G   B):
There is a now a discontinuity in the expected payo¤, but it is due solely
to the reputational penalty imposed by a ruling of negligence. It is easily
seen that the results of Proposition 3 would remain qualitatively the same,
except that we now have qN = 1 and that q0 and q1 would be larger. When
enforcement is above q1, there is bunching on the legal due care standard
only because of image concerns.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper incorporates normative motivations into the economic model of
tort rules. We showed that informal motivations and legal sanctions comple-
ment one another when each on its own would yield suboptimal precautions.
If the substantive laws are well designed but imperfectly enforced, a consid-
eration for the moral duty not to cause uncompensated harm or the attempt
to signal such concerns improves e¢ ciency. On the other hand, if compli-
ance with the moral duty is imperfect, appropriate liability rules improve
e¢ ciency even if the law is imperfectly enforced. There is no net crowding-
out of overall incentives following the introduction of formal sanctions. In
particular, when enforcement is imperfect, the negligence rule has the poten-
tial to do better than strict liability because image concerns have more bite
when potential injurers face the threat of being found negligent.
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In the unilateral accident model, potential victims are passive and can do
nothing to avoid harm. Who causedharm is then straightforward, although
the issue of causationmay still arise with respect to legal liability or moral
responsibility, as discussed above. How would our analysis extend to the so-
called bilateral model where both injurers and victims can take precautions?
Whether the injurer causedharm or should feel responsiblemay then be
problematic. If the victim acted foolishly, will the injurer feel bad if an acci-
dent occurs? Our results can be extended to the bilateral case through the
concept of causation in the manner discussed in the previous section, but
now taking into account the behavior of both injurer and victim, or through
the  function describing when moral responsibility is triggered. To illus-
trate, consider the simple negligence rule (as opposed, say, to contributory
negligence) and suppose that the injurer feels no guilt when he has complied
with due care but would feel guilty otherwise. Then we would get the same
results concerning the role of informal incentives under an imperfectly en-
forced negligence rule. The same holds mutatis mutandis if a non-complying
injurer feels guilt only when the victim did not act ine¢ ciently.
One limitation of our analysis is that social interactions arise only through
reputational e¤ects, as in Bénabou and Tirole (2006). These e¤ects are en-
dogenous, i.e., they depend on what can be inferred from various occurrences.
However, it may well be that intrinsic motivationalso depends on ones per-
ception of the extent to which others adhere to the moral norm, a form of
reciprocity or conditional cooperation (see Sugden 1984, Fischbacher et al.
2001, and Frey and Torgler 2007). Similarly, the desire to be perceived as
virtuous may presumably also depend on the importance of virtue to oth-
ers. An interesting extension of the present analysis would be to add these
channels of social interactions to the accident model.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1. We complete the argument in the text by
proving that, in the no-liability case, the equilibrium  belongs to (0; h).
Dene
 ()   
R h
0
[p0(;)  p0()]f() d
p0() (1  kp0())
; (A1)
where p0() is the average best response over all types. At equilibrium,
 =  (). From (12), p0(;) is non zero and is strictly decreasing in
. Hence, p0() 2 (0; 1) and therefore  () 2 (0; h) for all  2 [0; h],
implying that any solution belongs to the open interval as well. Existence of
a solution follows from the continuity of  (). QED
For the no-liability case, a solution to (A1) is a stable equilibrium if
 0() < 1. Clearly, there is at least one solution (e.g., the one with the largest
) at which the  () curve cuts the forty-ve degree line from above, imply-
ing  0() < 1. The equilibrium penalty depends on k and can be written as
(k). It can be shown that at any stable solution k(k) is increasing in k,
which proves the claim in the text that greater publicity increases incentives
to exert care.
Proof of proposition 2. We prove only the last claim. Let 0 and
S be the equilibrium reputational penalties under no liability and strict
liability respectively. Incentives are greater under strict liability if
[q + (1  q)]L+ qS > L+ k0
or equivalently
q(1  )L+ (qS   k0) > 0:
When q  k,
q(1  )L+ (qS   k0)  q [(1  )L+ (S  0)]
> q [(1  h)L  h] > 0:
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The last inequality follows from Assumption 1, the second-to-last from   h
and the fact that 0, S 2 (0; h). QED.
Before proving proposition 3, we rst characterize the pattern of compli-
ance under an imperfectly enforced negligence rule.
Lemma 2 If a type 0 injurer complies with due care, so does a type 00 > 0.
Proof. Let  = G   B > 0. Write the expected utility in (15) as
U(p; ) and let
U c()  max
pp
U(p; ) = b  c(p)  pL+ G: (A2)
This is the utility reached by a type- injurer who complies with due care.
Let
Unc()  sup
p>p
U(p; ): (A3)
This is the most an injurer can obtain when he does not comply. Then
Unc() = b  c(pnc())  pnc()[(q + (1  q))L+ q] + G (A4)
where
pnc() 
(
P [(q + (1  q))L+ q] if this is larger than p,
p otherwise.
(A5)
Let
()  U c()  Unc()
= c(pnc()) + pnc() [(q + (1  q))L+ q]  c(p)  pL:
We show that () = 0 has at most one solution in [0; h], say e, with
() > 0 if  > e and () < 0 if  < e. Applying the envelope theorem,
 0() = pnc()(1  q))L  pL
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and therefore
 00() = p0nc()(1  q))L  0:
Let us extend the range of possible values for  to [0; 1] and look for solutions
to () = 0 in this interval. From (A5), pnc(1) = p. Hence (1) = pq > 0
and  0(1) =   pqL < 0. Because () is concave and  0(1) < 0, () is (i)
either everywhere decreasing in the interval [0; 1] or (ii) rst increasing and
then decreasing. Because (1) > 0, a solution to () = 0 does not exist in
case (i) and at most one exists in case (ii). If one does, it is at some e < 1
such that  0(e) > 0. Concavity then implies ()  0 for   e; concavity
together with (1) > 0 imply () > 0 for  2 (e; 1]. If e  h, () does
not change sign in the interval [0; h]. If e < h, lower types in [0; h] do not
comply, higher types do. QED
Proof of proposition 3. Part (i) follows from lemma 2 and the argu-
ment in section 2. To show (ii), let q 2 [q1; qN ] and dene
v(B; k)  max
p
b  c(p)  qpL+ [pqB + (1  pq)]; B  :
This is the expected utility of type  = 0 if found liable with probability q
when bad news yields B and good news yields . The function is increasing
in B and decreasing in q. Let eB(q) solve
v(eB; k) = b  c(p) + ; (A6)
where the right-hand side is the utility of complying when good news yields .
Type  = 0 complies if B  eB(q). From (3), eB(q) =  when q = qN ; from
(16), eB(q) = 0 when q = q1. Moreover, eB(q) is increasing and continuous.
Thus, when q 2 [q1; qN), there is an upper bound eB(q) <  such that beliefs
satisfying B  eB(q) induce compliance when  = 0; by lemma 2, such
beliefs induce overall compliance.
When q < q1, equation (A6) has no solution. In equilibrium some injurers
will therefore not comply and both B and G will have positive probability,
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implying  2 (0; h). If some injurers comply, lemma 2 implies the exis-
tence of a type threshold (q) < h above which injurers comply. For q
su¢ ciently close to q1, such a threshold necessarily exists. For q su¢ ciently
small, however, it does not. To see this, dene
u(q)  max
p
b  c(p)  p(q + h(1  q))L+ (1  ph)h:
This is the expected utility of the high type  = h when he is found liable
with probability q with bad news yielding B = 0 and good news yielding
G = h, i.e., the anticipated reputational penalty is  = h. The function
is strictly decreasing in q. Let qc be the solution to
u(qc) = b  c(p)  hpL+ h: (A7)
The right-hand side is the expected utility of the same injurer if he complies.
It is easily veried that (A7) has a solution satisfying 0 < qc < q1. Because
at equilibrium we must have  < h, even the high type  = h would not
comply when q  qc. Thus, there exists some q0 2 (qc; q1) as stated in (iii)
and (iv). QED
Notes
1The basic model is due to Brown (1973) and has been developed, in
particular, in Landes and Posner (1987) and Shavell (1987).
2The distinction between guilt and shame as emotional sanctions has been
made in many contexts, e.g., Kandel and Lazear (1992). We follow Elster
(2007) in describing a prescription as a moral rulewhen a violator experi-
ences guilt; see also Shavell (2002), Kaplow and Shavell (2007) or for that
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matter Adam Smith (1790). In the law and economics literature, such pre-
scriptions are more often referred to as social norms, e.g., Posner (1997),
Posner and Rasmusen (1999), and Posner (2000). They are of course social
norms to the extent that violation elicits disapprobation or contempt.
3See Rasmusen (1996), Bohnet et al. (2001), Brekke et al. (2003), Harel
and Klement (2007), Lazzarini et al. (2004), Zasu (2007), and for a recent
survey McAdams and Rasmusen (2007).
4See Shavell (2007) for a recent survey. In Shavells terminology, injur-
ers and victims are strangers to one another, which rules out contractual
agreements to prevent or mitigate harm.
5In the next section, a large b also implies that individuals will not be
deterred from engaging in the activity out of moral or image concerns.
6Equivalently one could have written e = I , which amounts to adding
a constant to the utility function. The utility component e could also be
interpreted as the economic value of ones reputation; as such it would then
be part of the material payo¤. Tort law can obviously also be supplemented
by the standard reputation mechanism (see for instance Jin and Leslie 2003).
However, we will stick to the interpretation that individuals have a preference
for social esteem for its own sake.
7The action of not compensating is out-of-equilibrium. Any belief 0 2
[l; ] supports the equilibrium.
8When compensation is paid, the reputational utility is . When no
compensation is paid (an out-of-equilibrium action), it is 0, say with 0 =
l. Hence, compensation is the preferred action when  is su¢ ciently large.
9To illustrate in a di¤erent context, replace causing uncompensated harm
with stealing. Standard homo economicus is deterred from stealing only
because of the threat of criminal sanctions (or of retortion by others). If the
threat is nonexistent, he will steal. When normative concerns are at work,
the fear of feeling badand looking badmay in principle deter stealing.
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Under a preference restriction such as assumption 1, however, the individual
will nevertheless steal even though he knows he will feel badand look bad.
10See Shavell (1993). In a related context, Daughety and Reinganum
(2010) analyze the e¤ect of privacy versus publicity about ones actions.
11This is consistent with the D1 criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987) as used
in Bernheims (1994) theory of conformity.
12It need not be unique. We will nevertheless loosely refer to theequi-
librium. Should there be multiple equilibria, we focus on the one with the
largest reputational penalty (see the Appendix for details). Social interaction
models often exhibit multiple equilibria; e.g., Rasmusen (1996), Glaeser et
al. (1996) or Bénabou and Tirole (2006).
13Suppose that ones engagement in the activity becomes public knowledge
only when involvement in causing harm is observed. If type  does not engage,
his utility is therefore G; if he does, it is given by (11) with p = bp(). Since
 < h, it is then easily seen that Assumption 1 and b > c(p) + pL imply
that all types engage in the activity.
14Condential settlements by producers, to avoid sequential suits when
there are many potential plainti¤s or to exploit consumer ignorance about
the safety of a product, have been analyzed by Daughety and Reinganum
(1999, 2002).
15In the limit, S tends to zero as q approaches unity, but 0 always
remains strictly positive.
16Alternatively, one could have two classes of agents, potential victims and
potential injurers, and sum utility over both classes.
17For the purpose of computing welfare, we follow Bénabou and Tirole
(2006) in adding all three components of the utility function. See also Kaplow
and Shavell (2007).
18On the expressive theory of law, see Kahan (1997) and Cooter (1998).
Tyran and Feld (2006) and Galbiati and Vertova (2007) discuss experiments
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on the direct behavioral e¤ects of legal obligations, independently of sanc-
tions. See also McAdams and Nadler (2005).
19Shavell (1985) makes the point that causation is often highly uncertain
and that courts often nd the injurer liable if one cannot rule out that the
accident was due to the injurers negligence. The usual full liabilitymodel
is then an appropriate description.
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Figure 1: Expected utility under the negligence rule
42
De¤ains and Fluet, Figure 2 of 3
10
kq,
0q Nq1q
p
Sp
Np
0p
*p
Figure 2: Liability regimes
43
De¤ains and Fluet, Figure 3 of 3
10
U
p
*p )(qpnc
cU
)(qU nc
Figure 3: Expected utility for type  = 0 when q > q1
